Naming a phenomenon should imply some inference
If we call all phenomena with features with (x and y) a specific name, we are either implying that x and y are correlated with each other unnamed phenomena with features (x and z) or (y and z). Or, we are implying that a phenomena with features (x and y) is especially correlated with other properties.^[ Rationality, From A to Z#^6f364d]
Another way of putting it: Proper naming conventions should give us a hint about how the properties of the named phenomena are distributed in Concept-space.
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For example, Naming a phenomenon should imply some inference, so not all random phenomena should have names, giving us the impression that they occur more often than at random.
Another reason to prefer adjectives: Naming a phenomenon should imply some inference, and we don’t want to imply negative inferences (i.e. stereotypes).
“So having a word “wiggin” for green-eyed black-haired people is more useful than just saying “green-eyed black-haired person” precisely when: Green-eyed people are more likely than average to be black-haired (and vice versa), meaning that we can probabilistically infer green eyes from black hair or vice versa; or Wiggins share other properties that can be inferred at greater-than-default probability. In this case we have to separately observe the green eyes and black hair; but then, after observing both these properties independently, we can probabilistically infer other properties (like a taste for ketchup). One may even consider the act of defining a word as a promise to this effect. Telling someone, “I define the word ‘wiggin’ to mean a person with green eyes and black hair,” by Gricean implication, asserts that the word “wiggin” will somehow help you make inferences / shorten your messages.” (Eliezer Yudkowsky, Rationality)
^6f364d
“So having a word “wiggin” for green-eyed black-haired people is more useful than just saying “green-eyed black-haired person” precisely when: Green-eyed people are more likely than average to be black-haired (and vice versa), meaning that we can probabilistically infer green eyes from black hair or vice versa; or Wiggins share other properties that can be inferred at greater-than-default probability. In this case we have to separately observe the green eyes and black hair; but then, after observing both these properties independently, we can probabilistically infer other properties (like a taste for ketchup). One may even consider the act of defining a word as a promise to this effect. Telling someone, “I define the word ‘wiggin’ to mean a person with green eyes and black hair,” by Gricean implication, asserts that the word “wiggin” will somehow help you make inferences / shorten your messages.” (Eliezer Yudkowsky, Rationality)
^6f364d